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NOTE
THOMPSON V. FAIRFAX COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF
FAMILY SERVICES: DETERMINING THE BEST INTERESTS
OF THE INDIAN CHILD
Katerina Silcox†
I. INTRODUCTION
“Children are a gift from the Lord” – Psalm 127:3.
“Remember that your children are not your own, but are lent to you by the
Creator.” – Mohawk Proverb
In the Virginia case of Thompson v. Fairfax County Department of Family
Services,1 the Virginia Court of Appeals declined to recognize the so-called
“Existing Indian Family Exception” (hereinafter “EIF exception”) to the
Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) due to a plain text interpretation of the
ICWA that does not support application of the exception. The appellate court
joined a chorus of state courts recognizing that such an exception fails to
recognize Congress’ intent in enacting the ICWA: to promote the stability
and security of Indian tribes and families.2 In addition, rather than
determining whether to transfer the case to a tribal court by applying
Virginia’s best interests of the child factors, the court decided to break with
precedent and instead introduced an immediate harm standard.3 The case
was remanded to a trial court to determine whether the transfer to a tribal
court would cause, or would present a substantial risk of causing, immediate
emotional or physical damage to the child.4

† Senior Staff, LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, Volume 10. J.D. Candidate, Liberty
University School of Law (2016); B.A., Philosophy, The College of William and Mary (2010).
I dedicate this note to my parents, Charles and Darlene Silcox. All I have and will accomplish
are only possible due to their love and sacrifices. I would like to thank the entire editorial staff
of LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, Volume 10, for their tireless work and helpful guidance
in shaping this note.
1. Thompson v. Fairfax Cty. Dep’t of Fam. Servs., 62 Va. App. 350 (2013).
2. Id.; see generally Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95–608, 92 Stat. 3069
(1978).
3. Thompson, 62 Va. App. at 376.
4. Id. at 384.
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Thompson continues the recent trend of courts moving away from
judicially-created exceptions—exceptions that have helped perpetuate the
trend of state government interference in the placement of Native American
children that the ICWA was drafted to prevent. While these exceptions
originally sought to protect these children’s best interests, in retrospect, they
have caused irreparable harm in these children’s lives and have only reflected
American cultural biases.5 Yet, even today, history seems poised to repeat
itself as other courts weigh factors such as their state’s relevant best interests
of the child standard in determining when a transfer of the case to a tribal
court is appropriate. Courts throughout the country are split on the issue of
whether the child’s best interests are at all relevant in determining which
court has jurisdiction.
Understandably, these courts want to make placement decisions that will
most benefit the child in question. In doing so, transfers to tribal court are
often denied, as transferring the case will often delay placement of the child
in a permanent, loving home. Virginia, on the other hand, is the first state to
propose a solution to the difficult situation in which courts find themselves
when faced with the dual responsibility of satisfying requirements imposed
by federal legislation and ensuring that there is as little delay as possible in
placing a child. The longer a child is held in limbo, waiting for permanent
placement, the greater the potential for permanent harm to that child. This
fact is squarely at odds with the state’s duty as parens patriae to protect the
health, safety, and welfare of the child. This case note urges other courts to
adopt Virginia’s new standard.
II. BACKGROUND
Thompson presented a multifaceted sociological and legal case that must
be viewed through the prism of prior race relations. In this case, the court
faced two thorny legal issues posed by previous interpretations of the ICWA.
First, the court rejected application of the EIF exception which required that
the child in question has at some point resided in an “Indian” home in order
for the ICWA to apply, effectively eliminating the exception in the
Commonwealth of Virginia.6 Second, although the court continued the trend
moving away from application of judicially-created exceptions to the ICWA,
the Virginia court also rejected the “best interests of the child” test applied by
most courts.7 Instead, Virginia adopted a new standard that requires the party
5. Stacy Byrd, Learning from the Past: Why Termination of a Non-Citizen Parent’s Rights
Should Not Be Based on the Child’s Best Interests, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 323, 327 (2013).
6. Thompson, 62 Va. App. at 367.
7. Id. at 364-65.
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opposing removal to show that removal to tribal court would cause the child
immediate harm.8
A. Statement of the Case
1. Case Facts
B.N. was born in July of 2010. She has resided in Fairfax County, Virginia,
since her birth, and is a domiciliary thereof for traditional jurisdictional
purposes.9 For the first nine months of her life, she lived with her birth
parents, Jasmine Thundershield (referred to here, as in the trial record, as
Jasmine Vanderplas) and Minh-Sang Nguyen.10 Vanderplas is half Sioux,11
while Nguyen is of Vietnamese descent.12 The Bureau of Indian Affairs of the
United States Department of the Interior (“BIA”) certified that B.N. is onefourth Sioux,13 and thereby meets the minimum required degree of “Oceti
Sakowin” Indian blood for enrollment in the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe.14
“The Standing Rock Sioux Tribe has enrolled B.N. as a member of the
Tribe,”15 and “[t]here is no dispute that B.N. is a member of the Standing
Rock Sioux Tribe, a federally recognized ‘Indian tribe’ within the meaning of
the ICWA.”16
Unfortunately, both mother and father struggled with drug and alcohol
abuse and were often in trouble with the law.17 The pair was convicted of
numerous crimes before the Fairfax County Department of Family Services
(“Family Services”) decided to intervene.18 Family Services “initiated a variety
of steps designed to protect B.N.: a preliminary protective order, a foster care
placement on April 11, 2011, and ultimately, a petition to terminate the
parental rights of both parents.”19 The Juvenile and Domestic Relations
8. Id. at 374-76.
9. Id. at 356.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. CONSTITUTION OF THE STANDING ROCK SIOUX TRIBE Apr. 24, 1959,
http://www.nd.gov/indianaffairs/image/cache/Standing_Rock_Constitution.pdf
15. Thompson, 62 Va. App. at 356.
16. Id. at 363; see Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the
Bureau of Indian Affairs, 77 Fed. Reg. 47868-01, 47871 (Aug. 10, 2012) (listing the Standing
Rock Sioux Tribe of North and South Dakota as a federally recognized tribe).
17. Thompson, 62 Va. App. at 356.
18. Id.
19. Id.

144

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10:141

District Court of Fairfax County terminated Vanderplas’s and Nguyen’s
residual parental rights on May 3, 2012.20
Since being removed from the custody of her biological parents, B.N. has
resided with her foster parents, Tyrus and Ja’Ree Thompson.21 The
Thompsons wish to adopt B.N.,22 who suffers from Reactive Attachment
Disorder (RAD).23 This disorder is codified as 313.89 in the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. RAD is diagnosed through anecdotal
evidence of “disturbed and developmentally inappropriate social relatedness
in most contexts that begins before age 5 . . . .”24 RAD “is associated with
grossly pathological care that may take the form of . . . repeated changes of
primary caregiver that prevent formation of stable attachments (e.g., frequent
changes in foster care).”25
B. Procedural History
Throughout implementation of the Family Services plan to protect B.N.,
Family Services attempted to keep the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe (“the
Tribe”) informed of the status of B.N.’s case. On April 15, 2011, the Tribe
participated in the foster care placement hearing via telephone.26 On May 2,
2011, the Tribe was notified of their right to intervene in the foster care
proceedings, as per the ICWA, in a letter addressed to Terrance Yellow Fat,
representative of the Tribe.27 On May 10, 2011, the County mailed a copy of
the adjudicatory order to Mr. Yellow Fat, informing him that a dispositional
hearing on behalf of B.N. would take place on June 10, 2011.28 Over the next
year, Family Services continued attempts to notify the tribe by registered
mail, via Mr. Yellow Fat, of various adjudicatory hearings, dispositional
hearings, and hearings on the Family Service’s petitions for permanency
planning. On April 4, 2012, Family Services “attempted to contact Mr. Yellow
Fat by telephone and by sending him a letter by certified mail . . . informing
him of the upcoming court hearing scheduled for May 3, 2012, in Juvenile

20. Id. at 356-357.
21. Id. at 356.
22. Id. at 359.
23. Id. at 359.
24. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS
116 (4th ed. 1994).
25. Id.
26. Thompson, 62 Va. App. at 357.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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and Domestic Relations court.”29 On June 19, 2012, Family Services mailed
yet another certified letter to Mr. Yellow Fat informing the Tribe that the
hearing for the termination of parental rights was scheduled for August 6,
2012, in the Fairfax County Circuit Court, and that the Tribe had the right to
intervene in the proceedings.30
The Tribe failed to intervene until August 1, 2012, when a motion to
intervene was filed in Juvenile and Domestic Relations court.31 At the time,
however, the case was already pending in circuit court.32 Because of this
confusion, the “circuit court granted the parties’ motion to continue the trial
date from August 6, 2012, to September 11, 2012, and again to September 12,
2012.”33 On September 7, 2012, the Tribe filed a motion to intervene in the
circuit court, where the case was currently being tried,34 and the court granted
the motion that same day.35 On September 10, 2012, the Tribe, relying on the
ICWA, moved to transfer jurisdiction of the case to the tribal court.36 B.N.’s
biological parents, Vanderplas and Nguyen, were in favor of the Tribe’s
motion to transfer the case.37
Opposing this motion, Family Services, B.N.’s putative adoptive parents,
the Thompsons, and B.N.’s guardian ad litem, Nancy J. Martin, Esq., argued
that transfer of the case at such a late date would be inappropriate for three
reasons: first, the placement proceedings were at an advanced stage, and the
tribe had failed to promptly petition for transfer of jurisdiction prior to
adjudication, despite adequate notification per the IWCA; second, the
evidence necessary to decide the case could not be presented adequately in
the tribal court without undue hardship to Family Services, as well as the
witnesses involved in the case, because Standing Rock Sioux Tribal courts are
located in North Dakota, more than 1600 miles from Fairfax County; and
finally, transfer of the case would cause immediate harm to B.N., given her
diagnosis of RAD.38 Additionally Ms. Martin, B.N.’s guardian ad litem,
argued the EIF exception precludes application of the ICWA on these facts,

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 357-58.
Id. at 358.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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and thus the application of the ICWA in this case would be
unconstitutional.39
The circuit court rejected these arguments, and urged a finding of good
cause to deny transfer. As to the Family Service’s first argument, the court
held that “the proceedings were not at an advanced stage because the Tribe
presented its motion to transfer before the trial de novo on the termination
of parental rights.” 40 Furthermore, the parents had not been notified of their
independent right to request transfer and were prejudiced by this lack of
notice.41 As to the second argument, the court held that modern
technologies—such as video conferencing—could mitigate any
inconvenience posed to Family Services or their witnesses by trying the case
in the Standing Rock Sioux Tribal courts in North Dakota.42 The counsel for
the Tribe noted further that such practice has become “commonplace” in
many workplaces, and that such technology has provided an adequate means
of communication in similar cases.43 As to the third argument, the court held
that the best interests of the child was an inappropriate standard to use in
determining whether to transfer the case to a tribal court.44 As to the guardian
ad litem’s arguments, the court held that the statute was constitutional, both
on its face and as applied.45
The guardian ad litem filed an emergency motion to stay the court’s order
pending appeal and joined B.N.’s foster parents’ motion to reconsider the
trial court’s transfer.46 The foster parents contended further that because
B.N.’s biological father was not a member of the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe,
the tribal court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate the termination of his
parental rights.47 As such, “Fairfax County Circuit Court was the only court
with jurisdiction over both parents.”48 Therefore, the court had good cause to
refuse transfer.49 The circuit court denied the motion to reconsider, and
instead granted the motion to stay the order to transfer pending appeal.

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 358-59.
Id. at 359.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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C. A Brief History of ICWA
The ICWA was enacted on November 8, 1978.50 The Act governs which
court has jurisdiction over custody disputes involving Indian children. It
provides that tribes “shall have jurisdiction exclusive as to any State over any
child custody proceeding involving an Indian child who resides or is
domiciled within the reservation of such tribe . . . .”51 Once exclusive
jurisdiction is established, the tribe retains exclusive continuing jurisdiction
over the case, regardless of where the child is physically located. However,
when custody proceedings involve an Indian child who resides or is
domiciled outside of tribal lands, the tribe must share jurisdiction with the
state in which the child resides or is domiciled.52 Further, the ICWA provides
for certain placement preferences when Indian children are placed for
adoption.53 It allows the child’s tribe to intervene in custody proceedings and
remove the case to tribal court for adjudication within the tribal system.54
The purpose of the ICWA is to protect Indian children, preserve and
strengthen Indian families, ensure placement permanency for Indian
children, protect the continuing existence of Indian cultures, and ensure that
tribes can exercise their sovereign authority over child custody proceedings.55
It is through the preservation and maintenance of a relationship with family,
elders, tribal community, and culture that the Indian child’s sense of
permanence and identity is protected.56 The ICWA recognizes the vulnerable
nature of Native American tribes, and their need for protection. Native tribes
stand in a unique relationship to the United States government; they possess
special rights that must be recognized and protected in sensitive litigation,
such as child placement proceedings.57 As a part of the ICWA’s initial
50. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95–608, 92 Stat. 3069 (1978).
51. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a).
52. 25 U.S.C. §1911(b); Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 60-61
(1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Section 1911(b), providing for the exercise of concurrent
jurisdiction by state and tribal courts when the Indian child is not domiciled on the
reservation, gives the Indian parents a veto to prevent the transfer of a state-court action to
tribal court. ‘By allowing the Indian parents to ’choose’ the forum that will decide whether to
sever the parent-child relationship, Congress promotes the security of Indian families by
allowing the Indian parents to defend in the court system that most reflects the parents’
familial standards.’” (quoting Jones, Indian Child Welfare: A Jurisdictional Approach, 21 ARIZ.
L. REV. 1123, 1141 (1979)).
53. 25 U.S.C. § 1915.
54. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c); 25 U.S.C. § 1918.
55. 25 U.S.C. § 1901.
56. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1902.
57. Id.
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findings, Congress noted that, “[T]here is no resource that is more vital to
the continued existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their children . . .
.”58 Tribes rely on their children to continue the culture of the tribe. By taking
children away from their Native homes, or placing them in homes in which
contact with their Native tribe was rendered ostensibly impracticable, the
United States government was slowly destroying Native culture.
“The ‘wholesale separation of Indian children from their families’ was
widely viewed as the ‘most tragic and destructive aspect of American Indian
life.’”59 While this separation began as early as the 1800s when the
government began attempts to assimilate Native Americans by forcing
American Indian children into boarding schools, it reached its climax during
the 1970s, immediately before the ratification of the ICWA.60 The ICWA
“was the product of rising concern in the mid-1970s over the consequences
to Indian children, Indian families, and Indian tribes of abusive child welfare
practices that resulted in the separation of large numbers of Indian children
from their families and tribes through adoption or foster care
placement . . . .”61 Congress faced mounting pressure from states with large
Native American populations, where approximately twenty-five to thirty-five
percent of Native American children had been removed from their Native
homes.62 According to a 1969 study that examined the racial demographics
of foster care placements of Native American children across sixteen states,
approximately eighty-five percent of the children who had been removed
from their homes were placed in non-native foster homes.63 In South Dakota,
Native American children were sixteen times more likely than their nonnative peers to be placed in foster care.64 Adoption of Native American
children in Washington State was nineteen times the national average.65
Often, these children were removed from their Native homes by nonnative judges and social workers who lacked a thorough understanding of
Native American child rearing practices.66 For example, parental rights of
58. Id.
59. Cheyanna L. Jaffke, The “Existing Indian Family” Exception to the Indian Child
Welfare Act: The States’ Attempt to Slaughter Tribal Interests in Indian Children, 66 LA. L. REV.
733, 735 (2006) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 9 (1978)).
60. Id. at 734-35.
61. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 32 (1989).
62. B.J. JONES ET AL., THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT HANDBOOK: A LEGAL GUIDE TO THE
CUSTODY AND ADOPTION OF NATIVE AMERICAN CHILDREN 2 (2d ed. 2008).
63. Id. at 4.
64. Id. at 2.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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Native parents were terminated routinely for alleged neglect and emotional
abuse. The grounds for these claims were that the custodial parent left the
child with a non-nuclear family member for an extended period of time.67
While the practice of leaving one’s child in the care of an extended family
member for a protracted period of time is contrary to Anglo-Saxon
traditions, it is commonplace in Native American communities. In fact, it is
expected that the extended tribal family will raise the child.68
This common occurrence has shaped the narrative of many young Indian
lives. Larry Ahenakew of the Ahtahkakoop Cree, for instance, was removed
from his maternal grandmother’s custody when he was three and a half years
old.69 As per the Native American concept of family, those with whom a child
could be reared “included not only those in the nuclear family but also those
related by marriage or by some other traditional bond.”70 Other traditional
bonds included extended family members, such as aunts, uncles,
grandmothers, and grandfathers. As per Cree tradition, it was expected that,
because Larry was the eldest male child, his maternal grandmother would
raise him.71
However, Montana Child Protective services disagreed with Cree
tradition, and determined that Larry’s grandmother was an unfit caregiver.72
For years, Larry was disconnected from his tribal community and identity.
At the age of thirty-one, Larry was able to reunite with his family.73 Although
he had learned both Cree and English as a child and had a good
understanding of both languages when he was removed from his
grandmother’s care, Larry was unable to speak Cree with his grandmother
upon their reunion.74 In order to remedy the issues presented in cases like
Larry’s, and protect the unique standing of Native American tribes in relation
to the United States government, Congress passed a series of acts in the 1970s
to facilitate Native American self-determination, of which the ICWA was a
large part.

67. Id. at 3.
68. Id.
69. Lizbeth González, The Real Meaning of ICWA Noncompliance, 86-APR N.Y. ST. B.J.
29 (2014).
70. JONES ET AL., supra note 62, at 3.
71. González, supra note 69, at 29.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 30.
74. Id.
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D. Judicially Created Exceptions
1. Constitutionality of the ICWA
While implementation of the ICWA has served to ameliorate some of the
evils caused by cultural insensitivity and lack of oversight with respect to
Native custody hearings, many have questioned the constitutionality of the
Act. It has been characterized as a usurpation of states’ rights in state juvenile
proceedings and social service agencies.75 The ICWA derives its jurisdictional
authority from the Commerce Clause, which provides that “‘Congress shall
have Power. . . To regulate commerce. . . with Indian tribes . . . and, through
this and other constitutional authority, Congress has plenary power over
Indian affairs.”76 Historically, most effective attacks on the ICWA’s
constitutionality—and in fact, the only ones to have any influence on the
courts—have come in the form of equal protection claims.77
2. The “Existing Family Exception”
The “Existing Family Exception” is a judicially created doctrine that
originated in Kansas in the 1980s.78 This exception precludes the courts from
applying the ICWA to cases where the child in question has not been
removed from a traditionally Native home. Thus, if the “child’s parents have
not maintained . . . significant social, cultural, or political” affiliations with
their tribe of origin, the court can decide unilaterally that the child’s custody
determination is not protected by the provisions of the ICWA.79 While some
have argued that this exception is necessary to maintain the constitutionality
of the ICWA, others have viewed it as “a back-door approach to do exactly
what the ICWA was intended to prevent: imposition of white middle class
standards to child custody cases involving American Indian children.”80
As previously noted, the EIF exception was first proposed by the Supreme
Court of Kansas in the 1982 case In re Adoption of Baby Boy L.81 Allegedly,
the exception was necessary to preserve the constitutionality of the ICWA.82

75. JONES ET AL., supra note 62, at 1.
76. 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (2015) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8).
77. See In re Santos Y., 92 Cal. App. 4th 1274, 1305 (2001); Guardianship of Zachary H.,
73 Cal. App. 4th 51 (1999); Crystal R. v. Super. Ct., 59 Cal. App. 4th 703 (1997); In re
Alexandria Y., 45 Cal. App. 4th 1483 (1996); In re Bridget R., 41 Cal. App. 4th 1483 (1996).
78. In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168 (Kan. 1982).
79. Jaffke, supra note 59, at 741-42.
80. Id. at 741.
81. In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168 (Kan. 1982).
82. Jaffke, supra note 59, at 743.
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A line of California cases have held that any application of ICWA, based
solely upon the child’s race, rather than “substantial social, cultural, or
political affiliations” turns the ICWA into a race-based statute.83 As such,
California courts contend, it must withstand strict scrutiny in order to satisfy
the guarantee of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.84 This
argument, discussed in further detail below, is flawed in that the essential
element of the ICWA is that it is not triggered by the race of the child in
question, but rather, the child’s citizenship.85 In order for the ICWA to apply,
the child must either be a member of a federally recognized tribe, or eligible
for tribal membership.86
In Baby Boy L., a non-native mother sought termination of a Native
American father’s parental rights.87 Baby Boy L. was born to an unwed nonIndian mother and an Indian father.88 The non-native mother consented to
the adoption of Baby Boy L. by non-native adoptive parents.89 The biological
father, a five-eighths Kiowa Indian, his paternal grandparents, and the Kiowa
Indian tribe of which the biological father was an enrolled member, sought
review of the judgment of the Sedgwick County District Court.90 The court
entered a decree of adoption of Baby Boy L. in favor of the non-native
adoptive parents, and denied the tribe’s motion to intervene in the adoption
proceedings.91 On appeal, the Kiowa Tribe claimed that § 1901 of the ICWA
applied to the adoption proceedings and that the tribe had a right to
intervene.92 The Kansas Supreme Court held that the trial court was right to
determine that the plain text of the ICWA did not apply to Baby Boy L., as he
was only five-sixteenths Indian.93 Further, he had never been removed from
an existing Indian family.94 The court additionally held that any error that
83. See In re Santos Y., 92 Cal. App. 4th 1274, 1305 (2001); Guardianship of Zachary H.,
73 Cal. App. 4th 51 (1999); Crystal R. v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. App. 4th 703 (1997); In re
Alexandria Y., 45 Cal. App. 4th 1483 (1996); In re Bridget R., 41 Cal. App. 4th 1483, 1509
(1996).
84. Jaffke, supra note 59, at 743.
85. 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (2015).
86. Id.
87. In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168, 173 (Kan. 1982).
88. Id. at 172.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 172.
91. Id. at 188.
92. Id. at 172.
93. Id. at 175.
94. Id.
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could have occurred by refusing the Indian tribe’s petition to intervene was
harmless, and there was overwhelming evidence that the Indian father was
unfit to assume his parental duties.95 For this latter reason, and because the
biological father had failed to support Baby Boy L. for the two years prior to
the termination of his parental rights, the court held that the father’s consent
to the adoption of his illegitimate baby was not required.96 The court affirmed
the judgment of the trial court, which entered a decree of adoption of the
baby in favor of the adoptive parents and denied the Indian tribe’s motion to
intervene.97
The court held that the Act was intended only to apply to situations where
a child was being removed from an existing Indian family unit.98 In the years
following the decision in Baby Boy L., approximately half of the states
adopted the EIF exception, even though this exception is absent from the
actual text of the ICWA.99 Since its inception, the EIF exception has come
under harsh criticism. The exception essentially requires courts to assess the
“Indianness” of a particular Indian child, parent, or family, a subjective
determination that courts “are ill-equipped to make.”100 Most states have
abandoned this judicially created exception. However, some states—
including: Alabama,101 California,102 Indiana,103 Kentucky,104 Louisiana,105
Missouri,106 and Tennessee107—still apply the EIF exception. Alabama and
Indiana have limited the doctrine so that it only applies under certain rare
and extenuating circumstances.108
In Thompson, both the foster parents and the guardian ad litem relied on
persuasive case law from California, which holds that a failure to recognize
95. Id. at 180.
96. Id. at 188.
97. Id. at 188.
98. Id. at 175.
99. Dan Lewerenz & Padraic McCoy, The End of “Existing Indian Family” Jurisprudence:
Holyfield at 20, In the Matter of A.J.S., and the Last Gasps of a Dying Doctrine, 36 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 684, 687 n.10 (2010).
100. Thompson v. Fairfax Cty. Dep’t of Family Servs., 62 Va. App. 350, 368 (2013) (internal
quotations omitted).
101. S.A. v. E.J.P., 571 So. 2d 1187 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990).
102. In re Bridget R., 41 Cal. App. 4th 1483 (1996).
103. In re Adoption of T.R.M., 525 N.E. 2d 298 (Ind. 1988).
104. Rye v. Weasel, 934 S.W.2d 257 (Ky. 1996).
105. Hampton v. J.A.L., 658 So. 2d 331 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
106. C.E.H. v. R.H., 837 S.W.2d 947 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
107. In re Morgan, 1997 Tn. App. LEXIS 818 (1997).
108. Lewerenz & McCoy, supra note 99, at 687 n.11.
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the EIF exception raises doubts as to the constitutionality of the ICWA.109
They argued that statutes should be construed so as to avoid such doubts.110
California has invoked the EIF exception on numerous occasions, and “in
each case the effect of applying the [EIF exception] was to deny a tribe
jurisdiction or the right to intervene.”111 California courts have cited two
primary arguments for the necessity of applying the EIF exception: (1)
without the exception, the ICWA violates the equal protection clauses of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution,112 and (2)
application of the ICWA to familial situations where strong cultural ties do
not already exist violates the purpose of the ICWA.113
The appellant’s argument in the 1996 California Court of Appeals case of
In re Bridget R.114 is a prime example of this type of constitutional argument.
In In Re Bridget, the court held under the Fifth, Tenth, and Fourteenth
Amendments that:
[T]he ICWA does not and cannot apply to invalidate a voluntary
termination of parental rights respecting an American Indian
child who is not domiciled on a reservation, unless the child’s
biological parent, or parents, are not only of American Indian
descent, but also maintain a significant social, cultural, or political
relationship with their tribe.115
In re Bridget R. and similar cases have found that there is no equal protection
violation when custody determinations are based on Native Americans’
social, cultural, or political relationships with their tribes.116 “However, when
such social, cultural, or political relationships do not exist or are very
attenuated, they find the only remaining basis for applying the ICWA is the
child’s race.”117 Arriving at its determination by viewing the ICWA as a race109. Thompson v. Fairfax Cty. Dep’t of Family Servs., 62 Va. App. 350, 367 (2013). See
Eaton v. Davis, 176 Va. 330, 339 (1940) (“[A] statute will be construed in such a manner as to
avoid a constitutional question wherever this is possible.”).
110. Thompson, 62 Va. App. at 367.
111. Jaffke, supra note 59, at 742.
112. Id. at 743.
113. Id. at 744.
114. In re Bridget R., 41 Cal. App. 4th 1483 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
115. Jaffke, supra note 59, at 743-44.
116. See In re Santos Y., 92 Cal. App. 4th 1274, 1306 (2001); Guardianship of Zachary H.,
73 Cal. App. 4th 51, 63 (1999); Crystal R. v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. App. 4th 703 (1997); In re
Alexandria Y., 45 Cal. App. 4th 1483, 1485 (1996); In re Bridget R., 41 Cal. App. 4th 1483
(1996).
117. Jaffke, supra note 59, at 743.
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based statute, the In re Bridget R. court applied strict scrutiny as the
appropriate standard of review.118
This is a misinterpretation of the ICWA. Rather than being a race-based
statute, eligibility for ICWA protection is predicated on whether the child in
question is a member of a federally recognized tribe, or is eligible to apply for
membership in such a tribe.119 Each sovereign tribe decides it’s own
qualifications for tribal membership. Requirements for tribal citizenship are
separate and district from the requirements one must meet in order to be
eligible for benefits and services through the BIA. Citizenship, not race, is the
determining factor that triggers application of the ICWA. Given the
increased rate of biracial and multiracial births within the past decade,120 it is
not unfeasible that there could be an instance where a child may meet the
federal standards to qualify as Indian, but lack the requisite qualifications to
be eligible for tribal membership.121 In this instance, the child would be
eligible for benefits through the BIA but ineligible for ICWA protections. In
this way, a child’s rights under the ICWA are more analogous to those of a
non-citizen than they are akin to historically persecuted minority groups.122
As such, strict scrutiny is an inappropriate basis of review.
Another reason cited by the California courts for applying the EIF
exception is that they believe the purpose of the ICWA is to maintain
American Indian culture. If however, there is no culture to maintain, then
there is no need to apply the ICWA. As the California Court of Appeals stated
in In re Bridget, “It is almost too obvious to require articulation that ‘the
unique values of Indian culture’ will not be preserved in the homes of parents
who have become fully assimilated into non-Indian culture.”123 The
determination of who is fully assimilated into non-Indian culture is then left
to the court itself. California is not alone in this approach. Several other states
have refused to apply the ICWA unless an American Indian child is being
118. In re Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 523.
119. See 28 U.S.C. § 1903(4).
120. Carol Morello, Number of Biracial Babies Soars Over Past Decade, THE WASHINGTON
POST (Apr. 26, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/number-of-biracial-babiessoars-over-pastdecade/2012/04/25/gIQAWRiAiT_story.html.
121. Tribal membership eligibility standards vary by Tribe. Many, but not all, require a certain
blood quantum ranging from 1/2 (like the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians to 1/32 (like the
Kaw Nation). The Mississippi Bank of Choctaw Indians, Title XXII: Tribal Enrollment, MISSISSIPPI
BAND OF CHOCTAW INDIANS, http://www.choctaw.org/government/tribal_code/Title%2022%20OF
THE
KAW
NATION
2011,
%20Tribal%20Enrollment.pdf;
CONSTITUTION
http://kawnation.com/?page_id=3312.
122. Byrd, supra note 5, at 346.
123. In re Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. at 526.
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removed from an existing Indian family.124 These states misinterpret the
purpose of the ICWA by limiting it to the protection of American Indian
children from improper removal from their existing Indian family units to
promote the stability and security of American Indian tribes.
Most recently, the Supreme Court of the United States considered the
issue of the constitutionality of the EIF exception to the ICWA in the case of
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl.125 In this case, Dusten and Robin Brown sought
to adopt four-year-old baby Veronica.126 “The Browns based their adoption
petitions on the Indian preference provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act
. . . and the assumption that the Baby Girl Court did not affirm the EIF
exception doctrine . . . .”127 Baby Veronica was born to a non-native mother
and a Native father.128 The baby was a member of the Cherokee Nation.129
When Baby Veronica’s biological mother and father ended their relationship,
the father relinquished his parental rights,130 and Baby Veronica’s birth
mother placed her for adoption.131 The Browns commenced adoption
proceedings, at which time the biological father sought custody of Baby
Veronica.132 The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed a decision granting
the father custody under §§ 1901-1963 of the ICWA.133 The U.S. Supreme
Court granted certiorari to review the case.134
At no time, either prior to Baby Veronica’s birth or subsequently, did her
biological father provide any financial support for the child,135 nor did he ever
have custody of the girl.136 The Browns provided financial support during the
124. Including Alabama, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, and Tennessee. S.A. v.
E.J.P., 571 So. 2d 1187 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990); In re Bridget R., 41 Cal. App. 4th 1483 (1996); In
re Adoption of T.R.M., 525 N.E. 2d 298 (Ind. 1988); Rye v. Weasel, 934 S.W.2d 257 (Ky. 1996);
Hampton v. J.A.L., 658 So. 2d 331 (La. Ct. App. 1995); C.E.H. v. R.H., 837 S.W.2d 947 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1992); In re Morgan, 1997 Tn. App. LEXIS 818 (1997).
125. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013).
126. Marcia A. Zug, The Real Impact of Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl: The Existing Indian
Family Doctrine is Not Affirmed, but the Future of the ICWA’s Placement Preferences is
Jeopardized, 42 CAP. U.L. REV. 327, 327 (2014).
127. Id.
128. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. at 2558.
129. Id. at 2556.
130. Id. at 2558.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 2558-59.
133. Id. at 2559.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 2558.
136. Id. at 2557.
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biological mother’s pregnancy and had custody of the child prior to the state
court’s ruling.137 The Supreme Court held that, “The phrase ‘continued
custody’ therefore refers to custody that a parent already has (or at least had
at some point in the past). As a result, § 1912(f) does not apply in cases where
the Indian parent never had custody of the Indian child.”138 The court held
that this interpretation was consistent with both the plain text of the statute
and the purpose: to counteract the unwarranted removal of Indian
children.139 “[W]hen . . . the adoption of an Indian child is voluntarily and
lawfully initiated by a non-Indian parent with sole custodial rights, the
ICWA’s primary goal of preventing the unwarranted removal of Indian
children and the dissolution of Indian families is not implicated.”140 The
court found that § 1912(d), which addresses remedial services and
rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian
family,141 applied only where the breakup of an Indian family occurs as a
result of the termination of the parent’s rights.142 When, as in this case, a
Native parent abandoned his child prior to birth and never had custody, there
was no relationship in existence, nor any existing family to break up.143 The
ICWA’s adoption preferences under § 1915(a) were not implicated in this
case because the father had not sought custody of Baby Veronica.144 Rather,
he was arguing that his parental rights were terminated wrongfully.145
Marcia Zug, Associate Professor of Law at the University of South
Carolina School of Law, recently wrote an article concerning the Supreme
Court’s decision in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl.146 She argues that the
Court’s ruling ought to be limited to ICWA § 1912(d) and (f). As such, Baby
Girl should not be taken as a confirmation or endorsement of the EIF
exception. Nonetheless, she extrapolates that it will potentially “curtail the
applicability of the placement preferences in many future ICWA cases.”147
Clearly, the way in which courts will interpret and apply the EIF exception
to the ICWA is, at best, unclear. What is clear is that courts, such as the
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. at 2558.
Id. at 2560 (emphasis removed).
Id. at 2561.
Id.
25 U.S.C. § 1912(d).
Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. at 2562.
Id.
Id. at 2564.
Id.
Zug, supra note 126, at 327.
Id. at 328.
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Kansas Supreme Court in Baby Boy L., have historically used the EIF
exception to prevent application of the ICWA. Thus, many tribes have been
denied the protections supposedly guaranteed to them by the ICWA, as it
was never applied. Rather than judicially enshrining a practice that has led to
such abuse, courts ought to declare the EIF exception unnecessary, as
Virginia did in Thompson, and allow ICWA protections to safeguard tribal
interests as Congress originally intended.
E. Determination of Good Cause
Ensuring that ICWA protections are not obviated by judicially created
doctrines like the EIF exception is only one piece of the puzzle. Even when
courts have not outright refused to apply the ICWA, courts will still try to
hold on to jurisdiction over the proceedings by loosely interpreting the
appropriate standard for removal. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) states that “[i]n any
State court proceeding for the foster care placement of, or termination of
parental rights to, an Indian child not domiciled or residing within the
reservation of the Indian child’s tribe, the court, in the absence of good cause
to the contrary.”148 However, that which constitutes “good cause” is never
adequately defined. In the absence of a definition within the statute, the
courts have endeavored to determine what constitutes “good cause.”
1. Best Interests of the Child
Many courts have adopted a test that weighs various factors in
consideration of the best interests of the child in determination of whether
good cause exists to deny a transfer of a case to tribal court. 149 In fact, a best
interest standard is the standard currently championed by the Bureau of
Indian Affairs guidelines. Still, other courts have rejected this type of analysis
as irrelevant.150 The Thompson opinion articulates the rationale underlying
148. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b).
149. See In re Appeal in Maricopa Cty. Juvenile Action No. JS-8287, 828 P.2d 1245, 1249
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1991); Weigle v. Devon T. (In re Robert T.), 200 Cal. App. 3d 657, 663 (1988);
J.Q. v. D.R.L. and E.M.L. (In re Adoption of T.R.M.), 525 N.E.2d 298, 307 (Ind. 1988); In re
T.S., 801 P.2d 77, 80 (1990); In re J.L., 654 N.W.2d 786, 790 (S.D. 2002); see also Carney v.
Moore (In re N.L.), 754 P.2d 863, 876-77 (Okla. 1988) (Opala, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
150. See People ex rel. J.L.P., 870 P.2d 1252, 1258-59 (Colo. App. 1994); In re Armell, 550
N.E.2d 1060 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); T.W. v. L.M.W. (In re C.E.H.), 837 S.W.2d 947, 954 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1992); State v. Elise M. (In re Zylena R), 825 N.W.2d 173, 184-86 (Neb. 2012); In re
Guardianship of Ashley Elizabeth R., 863 P.2d 451, 456 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993); Hoots v. K.B.
(In re A.B.), 663 N.W.2d 625, 633-34 (N.D. 2003); Yavapai-Apache Tribe v. Mejia, 906 S.W.2d
152, 168-71 (Tex. App. 1995).
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the approach taken by the courts that do not apply the best interest factors. “[B]y
providing tribal courts with presumptive jurisdiction, Congress presumed that
[the tribal courts, rather that the state] courts would consider a child’s best
interests in adjudicating a termination of parental rights case.”151
In Virginia, there are ten factors that the court considers in determining
the best interests of the child. These are: (1) the age and physical and mental
condition of the child, giving due consideration to the child’s changing
developmental needs; (2) the age and physical and mental condition of each
parent; (3) the relationship that exists between each parent and each child,
giving due consideration to the positive involvement in the child’s life, the
ability to accurately assess and meet the emotional, intellectual and physical
needs of the child; (4) the needs of the child, giving due consideration to other
important relationships of the child, including, but not limited to, siblings,
peers and extended family members; (5) the role that each parent has played
and will play in the future, in the upbringing and care of the child; (6) the
propensity of each parent to support the child’s contact and relationship with
the other parent actively, including whether a parent has unreasonably
denied the other parent access to or visitation with the child; (7) the relative
willingness and demonstrated ability of each parent to maintain a close and
continuing relationship with the child, and the ability of each parent to
cooperate in and resolve disputes regarding matters affecting the child; (8)
the reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child to be of
reasonable intelligence, understanding, age and experience to express such a
preference; (9) any history of family abuse or sexual abuse; and (10) any other
factors that the court deems necessary and proper to the determination.152
After reaching a decision based on the merits of these factors, a judge shall
communicate, either orally or in writing, his findings regarding factors
relevant to his/her custody decision.153
2. Proposed Solution: Immediate Harm
As a solution to the quandary posed by the jurisdictional split on the
application of the analysis of the best interests of the child, the Court of
Appeals of Virginia proposed the application of a new standard. They
“conclude[d] that the appropriate test is whether the transfer of jurisdiction
itself would cause, or would present a substantial risk of causing immediate,
serious emotional or physical damage to the child.”154
151.
152.
153.
154.

Thompson v. Fairfax Cty. Dep’t of Family Servs., 62 Va. App. 350, 374 (2013).
VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.3 (2012).
Id.
Thompson, 62 Va. App. at 374-75.
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III. ANALYSIS
In order to appreciate fully the ramifications of the court’s decision in
Thompson, it is necessary to evaluate the rights of the interested parties. “In
cases involving children there is often no obvious ‘bad guy.’”155 Excluding
sporadic cases involving malice, each party to a custody dispute simply seeks
a placement that is in the best interests of the child. Conflicts arise when the
parties disagree as to what those best interests are. In order to weigh and
balance the competing interests, it is important to first examine the concept
of best interests.
A. Interests of the Parties Involved
1. Child’s Interests
Native children pose a unique challenge in placement, as they have unique
best interests. In these cases, the court cannot merely take into consideration
the best interests of that individual child, but also must consider what is in
the best interests of continuing that child’s cultural legacy. This is a lofty task
for any court. For this reason, the ICWA sets a standard that is sufficiently
malleable to adapt to the individual circumstances of the case, while
maintaining certain presumptive preferences and preserving the right of the
Tribe to intervene.
“[A] parent’s right to the preservation of his relationship with his child
derives from the fact that the parent’s achievement of a rich and rewarding
life is likely to depend significantly on his ability to participate in the rearing
of his offspring.”156 Correspondingly, a child’s right to protection of the
relationship he shares with either or both parents “derives from the psychic
importance to him of being raised by a loving, responsive, reliable adult.”157
This language speaks to the right of each and every child, regardless of race
or citizenship, to remain connected to that from which he or she came; a right
to remain in contact with their culture or their “roots.” This notion is
embodied in the practice of placing children preferentially with family
members before seeking to place them within the foster system. The ICWA
takes this notion a step further to require that Native children presumptively
be placed in Native homes.158 In this way, these children are able to remain in

155.
156.
157.
158.

Byrd, supra note 5, at 327.
Franz v. United States, 707 F.2d 582, 599 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
Id.
25 U.S.C. § 1915 (2012).
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touch with their cultural “roots” and ensure the continuation of Native
culture for future generations of their own progeny.
The right to a sense of belonging is an internationally recognized right for
children.159 The United Nations “Convention on the Rights of the Child”
provides for such rights, such as the right of the child to “preserve his or her
identity, including nationality, name, and family relations, as recognized by
law, without lawful interference.”160 Further, when the child’s right to
preserve his or her identity is interfered with or “[w]here a child is illegally
deprived of some or all of the elements of his or her identity, States’ parties
shall provide appropriate assistance and protection, with a view to
reestablishing speedily his or her identity.”161 Under the convention, children
maintain a recognized right to freedom of thought, conscience, and
religion,162 as well as the right to freedom of association and peaceful
assembly.163 The U.S. is not currently a signatory to this convention.164
However, international public opinion seems to want standards set by an
international governing body, like the United Nations, as de facto
minimums, even though they may not be de jure.165
2. Parents’ Interests
Parents have a fundamental right to raise their children.166 Virginia courts
have historically held that, “[n]o bond is so precious and none should be
more zealously protected by the law as the bond between parent and child.”167
“A parent’s right to the custody of his or her children is an element of ‘liberty’
guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of
the United States.”168 Only when the state shows that a parent is unfit to
adequately care for the needs of his or her child may the state intervene in the
parent/child relationship.169 These protections are “not confined to the
protection of citizens[,] . . . [t]hese provisions are universal in their
application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Hon. Peter J. Herne, Best Interests of an Indian Child, N.Y. ST. B.J. 22, 23 (2014).
G.A. Res. 44/25, Art 8, §1 (Nov. 20, 1989).
Id., Art. 8, § 2.
Id., Art. 14, § 1.
Id., Art. 15, § 1.
Herne, supra note 159, at 23 n.10.
See generally id.
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68 (2000).
Carson v. Elrod, 411 F. Supp. 645, 649 (E.D. Va. 1976).
In re Gentry, 369 N.W.2d 889, 892 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985).
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68-69.
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to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality.”170 The state may only
interfere with parental rights, of either a citizen or noncitizen, if there is
evidence that a parent is unfit to care for the needs of the child.171
In Thompson, the state was able to show that both the biological mother
and father were unfit to the task of parenthood,172 and because of their
individual frailties, they were unable to care for the daily needs of their
child.173 However, their participation in the case is evidence that the
termination of their parental rights did not eliminate their interest in their
child’s wellbeing. Given the circumstances, it is noteworthy that the court
allowed the disenfranchised parents to continue to participate in the
proceedings, as well as noting the parents’ preferences throughout the
opinion.174 The court in Thompson made specific mention of B.N.’s parents’
support of the motion to transfer the case to tribal court.175 While B.N.’s
parents had lost their right to any legal claim over her, the court recognized
their wishes, as though it were recognizing the important role this connection
to her parents’ wishes would play in her life.
3. Tribal Interests
“Tribal Nations are possessed with inherent sovereignty . . . [and]
relationships between a Tribal Nation and its members are within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribal Nation.”176 Native American Tribal
Nations stand in a unique political relationship to the United States of
America.177 Tribal nations are sovereign entities that possess exclusive
jurisdiction over tribal matters.178 This legal status grants Native American
children unique legal status as well, which, in turn, must be observed during
child custody disputes wherein the ICWA grants the Tribe exclusive
170. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).
171. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68.
172. Thompson v. Fairfax Cty. Dep’t of Family Servs., 62 Va. App. 350, 356-57 (2013).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 358.
176. Herne, supra note 159, at 22. See also United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557
(1975) (“Indian tribes are unique aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both
their members and their territory; they are a ‘separate people’ possessing ‘the power of
regulating their internal and social relations.’”) (citations omitted) (quoting United States v.
Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1886) and McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S.
164, 173 (1973)).
177. See, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); see generally Worcester
v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
178. Mazurie, 419 U.S. at 557.
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jurisdiction. Though some have challenged the constitutionality of the ICWA
on the grounds of equal protection, this unique legal status is not due to any
consideration of the child’s race. Rather, an Indian child enjoys certain rights
and privileges by virtue of his or her citizenship or membership of a sovereign
nation or tribe.179 These rights include, but are not limited to: those provided
for by federal law, state statute, or Indian treaty; certain educational benefits
offered by the BIA and various other organizations; various healthcare
benefits offered by the BIA and other organizations; international border
crossing rights; the right to own and inherit reservation property; a right to
participate in Tribal Governance; entitlement payments from their tribal
government, and, finally, a right to a sense of belonging.180 As such, the “best
interests of an Indian child” are inherently different from the “best interests
of a child” standard.
4. States’ Interests
As parens patriae, the state has an interest in the health, safety, and welfare
of children.181 Prince v. Massachusetts established that the society’s interest in
protecting children is a compelling state interest182 that may trump a parent’s
right to the custody of his or her children when the child’s safety and wellbeing are at risk.183 The State has a duty to protect that child and, if necessary,
intrude on the parents’ right to raise the child by both retaining custody and
directing the child’s religious and moral upbringing.
B. Effect of a Judicially Created Exception
1. Existing Indian Family Exception
In her 1997 testimony before the Joint Hearing of the House Resources
Committee and the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, Assistant Secretary
of the Interior, Ada Deer, of the Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin
stated:
[W]e want to express our grave concern that the objectives of the
ICWA continue to be frustrated by State court created judicial
exceptions to the ICWA. We are concerned that State court judges
who have created the “existing Indian family” exception are
delving into the sensitive and complicated areas of Indian cultural
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Herne, supra note 159, at 22.
Id. at 22-23.
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
Id. at 165.
Id. at 167.
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values, customs, and practices[,] which under existing law have
been left exclusively to the judgment of Indian tribes. . . . We
oppose any legislative recognition of the concept.184
The EIF exception to the ICWA is a prime example of a state court reading
public bias into the law. It obviates the law by allowing the court to make its
own individual determination of the “Indian-ness” of the child in question.
Further, it uses racial stereotypes to meet these objectives. For example, one
test used by courts to evaluate whether the child had previously been part of
an existing Indian family includes determining whether the child had
previously lived “in an ‘actual Indian dwelling,’ apparently thinking of a
teepee, hogan, or pueblo.”185
2. Application of the best interests of the child standard
The ICWA itself uses “best interest” language.186 However, it would be a
mistake to assume that application of traditional best interest factors is what
the legislation intended. “It is likely that most attorneys simply consider
Indian child merely as a racial factor in the standard. This response, however,
fails to recognize that a best interest of an Indian child standard is inherently
different from [the state’s] best interest of a child standard.”187 The “best
interests of the child” are not coterminous with the “best interests of the
Indian child.” Rather, the language must be read in the context of the ICWA
as a whole. The statutory language links the best interests of the Indian child
with the best interests of the Indian parent.188 In turn, these interests are
linked with the best interests of the tribal community as a whole.189 “ICWA
is not the only place to find the phrases ‘best interest’ and ‘Indian child,’
however. In fact, it has been at the state level that some of the most

184. Joint Hearing of the House Resources Committee and Senate Committee on Indian
Affairs, on H.R. 1082 and S. 569, Bills to Amend the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 105th
Cong. (June 18, 1997) (statement of Ada E. Deer, Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs,
Department
of
the
Interior)
http://naturalresources.house.gov/uploadedfiles
/ada_e._deer_testimony_6.18.97.pdf.
185. Christine Metteer, Pigs in Heaven: A Parable of Native American Adoption under the
Indian Child Welfare Act, in MIXED RACE AMERICA AND THE LAW: A READER 393, 398 (Kevin
R. Johnson ed., 2003).
186. 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (2012).
187. Herne, supra note 159 at 22.
188. Id. at 23.
189. Id.
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noteworthy efforts at joining these terms into a ‘best interest of an Indian
child’ standard can be found.”190
C. Potential Effects of Applying an Immediate Harm Standard
1. Advantages
There seem to be more advantages than drawbacks to the application of
this standard. First, it appropriately respects tribal interests. Narrowly
defining “good cause” as that which would not cause immediate harm to the
child is more consistent with Congress’ intent in enacting the ICWA, thus
ensuring Indian children are not capriciously ripped away from their culture
in a short sighted attempt at assimilation. The immediate harm standard
preserves the right of Tribes to intervene and limits the degree to which
courts can interfere with this right. It demonstrates a proper respect for and
deference to tribal courts. Tribal courts are composed of tribe members.
These individuals, the ones most familiar with the culture and its
importance—not only the child, but the tribe as a whole—are the ones best
situated to determine the best interests of the Indian child. The court in
Thompson writes that Congress presumed that “in the event of a transfer,
tribal courts are fully competent to consider the child’s best interests in
adjudicating the termination of parental rights proceeding.”191
Second, it adequately takes into consideration the rights and interests of
the child. An immediate harm standard retains a certain degree of latitude in
its application. It is a malleable enough standard to anticipate that there may
be some instances in which removal would harm the child. For instance, as
the putative adoptive parents contended in Thompson, removing the case to
tribal court may have a profound effect on a child with pronounced
attachment issues.192 In these instances, the immediate harm standard
provides an escape mechanism.
2. Drawbacks
Although applying an “immediate harm” standard is a more appropriate
standard than that of the “best interest of the child” for the reasons
190. Id. See also In re Alexandria P., 228 Cal. App. 4th 1322, 1355-56 (2014); In re N.B., 199
P.3d 16, 23-24 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007); Seminole Tribe v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 959 So.
2d 761, 766 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 2007); In re Rules of Juvenile Prot. Procedure
Including Amendments Effective July 1, 2014, 2014 Minn. LEXIS 417, *254 (Minn. July 1,
2014); In re S.B.C., 340 P.3d 534, 540 (Mont. 2014); In re Zylena R. v. Elise M., 825 N.W.2d
173, 186 (Neb. 2012); Hoots v. K.B. (In re A.B.), 663 N.W.2d 625, 630 (N.D. 2003).
191. Thompson v. Fairfax Cty. Dep’t of Family Servs., 62 Va. App. 350, 376 (2013).
192. Id. at 359.
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aforementioned, it nonetheless imposes judicial reasoning on the statute.
Section 1911(b) is vague with respect to what constitutes “good cause” to
deny transfer. As with any new standard, there may be unforeseen
disadvantages in defining “good cause” with an immediate harm standard. It
may take time before any potential unforeseen harm becomes known. In the
meantime, other courts may be slow to adopt Virginia’s standard.
IV. A CALL FOR CHANGE
The ICWA, as applied, fails to meet its intended purpose. Native American
advocates claim that the ICWA hurts those it was intended to protect.193 They
are angry that “[f]ederal tax dollars are being used across the country to
support the enactment and adherence to this law; however in thousands of
cases, the law is destroying loving, stable families and placing children in
harmful and difficult situations.”194
Due to alleged abuses of judicial discretion, there has been a recent
movement for increased federal oversight over the implementation of, and
compliance with, ICWA. In early 2014, several Native American advocacy
organizations, including the National Congress of American Indians, the
Native American Rights Fund, the National Indian Child Welfare
Association, and the Association on American Indian Affairs sent a letter to
the Department of Justice urging them to investigate ICWA violations
nationwide.195 In December 2014, President Obama hosted the White House
Tribal Nations Conference in Washington, D.C.196 The conference provided
leaders from the 566 federally recognized tribes a forum in which to discuss
pertinent issues with U.S. leaders, including the President and members of
the White House Council on Native American Affairs.197

193. Amending the Indian Child Welfare Act, COAL. FOR THE PROT. OF INDIAN CHILDREN

AND FAMILIES (Sept. 11, 2015), http://coalitionforindianchildren.org/amending-icwa/.

194. Id.
195. Letter from the National Congress of American Indians, the Native American Rights
Fund, the National Indian Child Welfare Association, and the Association on American
Indian Affairs to Jocelyn Samuels, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division,
U.S. Dept. of Justice and Eve L. Hill, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division,
U.S. Dept. of Justice (Feb. 3, 2014) (on file with Dept. of Justice),
http://narf.org/bloglinks/narf_nicwa_ncai_aaia_ltr_to_doj.pdf.
196. Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, President Obama Announces
2014 White House Tribal Nations Conference (Oct. 20, 2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/2014/10/20/president-obama-announces-2014-white-house-tribal-nations-conference.
197. Id.
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V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
At the conclusion of the Conference, U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder
briefly outlined the administration’s plan to enhance compliance with the
ICWA. This included an unprecedented announcement that the Department
of Justice will begin to intervene by filing amicus briefs in state court cases
involving Native American children in order to make sure that state agencies
comply with the act. Holder announced, “We are working to actively identify
state-court cases where the United States can file briefs opposing the
unnecessary and illegal removal of Indian children from their families and
their tribal communities.”198 The administration would be “redoubling” its
efforts to support the ICWA, in order to “protect Indian children from being
illegally removed from their families; to prevent the further destruction of
Native traditions through forced and unnecessary assimilation; and to
preserve a vital link between Native children and their community that has
too frequently been severed.”199
In contrast to the Obama administration’s proposed suggestion that the
solution to historical unjust application of the ICWA lies in increased federal
governmental intervention in state juvenile and domestic relations courts,
other organizations have agreed that the time has come to amend the ICWA.
One such organization, the Coalition for the Protection of Indian Children
and Families (CPICF), states that its “mission is to successfully advocate for
reasonable and timely amendments to the Indian Child Welfare Act in order
to ensure Indian children and families are free from unnecessary pain and
suffering.”200 The organization believes that “children of Indian descent will
be granted greater access to loving, permanent homes regardless of heritage
by minimizing the barriers caused by the Indian Child Welfare Act.”201 To
protect children who have Native American heritage and their families,
amendments must be made to the Indian Child Welfare Act. Proposed
amendments include:
1.

Ensure an Indian child has a “parent” as defined by the law
and the parent has properly established paternity under state
law.

198. Attorney General Eric Holder, Remarks during the White House Tribal Nations
Conference (Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-eric-holderdelivers-remarks-during-white-house-tribal-nations.
199. Id.
200. Mission and Vision, COAL. FOR THE PROT. OF INDIAN CHILDREN AND FAMILIES (Sept. 11,
2015), http://coalitionforindianchildren.org/about/mission_vision/.
201. Id.
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Provide fit birth parents of Indian children the right to choose
healthy guardians or adoptive parents for their children
without concern for heritage.
Ensure that the “qualified expert witness” is someone who is
able to advocate for the well-being of the Indian child, first
and foremost.
Clarify that the ICWA [applies] to family court disputes, not
just divorce proceedings, over Indian children.
Clarify that the ICWA allows transfer only of foster care and
termination proceedings and that transfer motions must be
filed within 30 days from the start of the proceeding.
Clarify that an Indian birth mother does not need to consent
to adoption in court.
Limit a parent’s right to revoke to 30 days versus the current
practice allowing birth parents to revoke their consent up to
12 months after a child has been placed.
Clarify that final adoptions may only be vacated for fraud
within limits under state law. The ICWA currently gives
parents two years. There are adoptive parents who are
terrified for two years after the adoption is final due to this
requirement.
Define “good cause” to allow for the birth parent’s preference,
lack of Indian home after search, and the child’s emotional,
physical, and developmental needs.202

The coalition suggests that these amendments “must be made to this law to
help ensure children of Indian heritage have the same rights as all other
children in the United States,” and ensure they find safe, happy, healthy,
permanent homes.203
Amending the ICWA is an attractive solution. Statutory drafting requires
prudent decision-making. Drafters can use vague language in order to give
the courts a certain degree of latitude when deciding an issue. However, they
run the risk of allowing inconsistent applications of the law throughout the
various jurisdictions. This is exactly what has occurred with the ICWA to
date. While courts have attempted to apply good judgment in defining what
constitutes “good cause” for transfer, they yet again find themselves in the
difficult position of setting precedent that will allow cultural bias to seep in
and corrode the foundations of the law, thereby obviating its intended
purpose, and allowing historical abuses to be perpetuated.
202. Amending the ICWA, supra note 193.
203. Id.
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While the amendment of the ICWA would be an ideal long-term solution,
the process can be lengthy. Rather than allowing increased federal oversight
of state domestic relations courts, this case note suggests that state juvenile
and domestic relations courts throughout the country follow Virginia’s lead
in adopting an immediate harm standard when deciding whether to transfer
a case to tribal court under § 1911(b).
VI. CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVE
“All Scripture is breathed out by God and profitable for teaching, for
reproof, for correction, and for training in righteousness.”204 Scripture, in the
form of the Holy Bible, provides the foundation of the Christian worldview.
Under a Christian worldview, the child is not the creature of the state, but
rather a child of God. God entrusts parents and families to rear their children
in a manner that is glorifying to God. Ephesians 6:4 states, “Fathers, do not
provoke your children to anger, but bring them up in the discipline and
instruction of the Lord.”205 By specifically instructing fathers to lead children
in the discipline and instruction of Lord, God is making an exclusive grant of
authority to the family, and not the civil government. However, this does not
imply that the civil government has no role in the governance of children.
Romans 13:4 states that the civil government is “God’s minister to you for
good. But if you do evil, be afraid; for he does not bear the sword in vain; for
he is God’s minister, an avenger to execute wrath on him who practices
evil.”206 This grant of divine authority allows the civil government to punish
evildoers, or in the realm of child welfare, remove children from abusive or
neglectful parents.
The Supreme Court of the United States echoed this view in the 1925 case
of Pierce v. Society of the Sisters.207 Writing for a unanimous court, Justice
McReynolds wrote, “The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who
nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty,
to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.”208 The Pierce case
dealt with the rights of the parents to choose appropriate education for their
children.209 It stands for the principle that parents have a right to help guide
their child’s development, free of unnecessary government intervention.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

2 Timothy 3:16 (ESV).
Ephesians 6:4 (ESV).
Romans 13:4 (NKJV).
Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
Id. at 535.
Id.
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Similarly, many cases regarding the ICWA, like Thompson, stand for the
rights of the Tribe, acting as parent, to help guide the development of Native
children.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has recognized that “while there is still reason to
believe that positive, nurturing parent-child relationships exist, the State’s
interest as parens patriae favors preservation, not severance, of natural
familial bonds.”210 For Native children, this idea of familial bonds extends to
include tribal bonds. Short of an amendment to the ICWA, courts deciding
whether to transfer a case to tribal court under § 1911(b) should apply the
immediate harm standard because it best balances the competing interests of
the child and continuation of tribal culture. Further discussion of this topic
will help to better interpret an ill-defined and often misapplied standard.
Insofar as courts are currently split on this issue, further discussion is
necessary in order to achieve a uniform and reliable system of justice that will
serve the needs of children, families, and Native tribes adequately.

210. Stantosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766-67 (1982).

